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Abstract—The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
encourages the use of Data Protection Impact Assessments
(DPIAs) to integrate privacy into organisations’ activities and
practices from early design onwards. To date, however, there
has been little prescription about how Security & Privacy Re-
quirements Engineering processes map to the necessary activities
of a DPIA, and how these activities can be tool-supported. To
address this problem, we present a tool-supported process for
undertaking DPIAs using existing Requirements Engineering
approaches and the CAIRIS platform. We illustrate this process
using a real-world case study example where it was used to
elicit privacy risks for a prototype medical application to support
chemotherapy treatment.
Index Terms—GDPR, Privacy, Risk, Requirements Engineer-
ing, CAIRIS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The protections afforded to EU citizens’ data privacy by the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) have led many
organisations to rethink how they collect, process, and manage
personal data. GDPR requires organisations to integrate data
protection into processing activities and business practices
from early design through the product or service lifecycle [1].
To satisfy this requirement, the regulation encourages or-
ganisations to undertake a Data Protection Impact Assessment
(DPIA) to identify and minimise data protection risks as the
initial step of any new project. Depending on the approach
adopted, DPIAs should be relatively cheap to implement with
sufficient resources and tools. However, while there is advice
on the legal requirements for DPIA and the elements of what
practitioners should do to undertake a DPIA [2], there is less
prescription on how they should do it.
An evaluation of existing Privacy Requirements Engineering
approaches [3] has found that existing approaches capture
the elements that would be needed by a DPIA. For example,
PriS [4] supports the ability to capture business and privacy
goals, while LINDDUN [5] supports the flow of information,
and threat modelling activities conducive to assessing privacy
risks. However, two barriers need to be overcome before
such approaches are ready for security and practitioners to
use in DPIAs. First, more prescription is needed to indicate
what tools and techniques map to different stages of a DPIA.
Second, such steps need to be adequately tool-supported, such
that data input in one step can be used to support reasoning
and analysis in others.
IRIS (Integrating Requirements and Information Security)
is a process framework for devising processes for designing
usable and secure software [6]. It is complemented by CAIRIS
(Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and Information
Security): an open-source platform that can be used with
an IRIS process [7]. Although not initially designed with
privacy in mind, the framework illustrates how commonly used
Security, Usability, and Requirements Engineering techniques
can be orchestrated as tool-supported processes.
CAIRIS [7] has been used in a variety of case studies,
ranging from the creation of user-centred security policies
in critical infrastructure, to the design and development of
a secure and privacy preserving web middleware platform
[6]. Based on these experiences, we believe CAIRIS supports
the concepts required by a tool-supported DPIA process as
well. To explore this possibility, we present a tool-supported
DPIA process using CAIRIS. The DPIA process orchestrates
concepts from the IRIS meta-model, while CAIRIS acts as
tool-support for each stage of the process. We consider the
background for our approach in Section II, before presenting
the approach itself in Section III. We illustrate the approach
by describing its use in assessing the privacy implications of a
mobile medical application in Section IV, before considering
the implications of our work in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Supporting GDPR with Requirements Engineering
To comply with GDPR, data processing should adhere to
seven principles: (i) Lawfulness, fairness and transparency, (ii)
Purpose limitation, (iii) Data minimisation, (iv) Accuracy, (v)
Storage limitation, (vi) Integrity & Confidentiality, and (vii)
Accountability [8]. The regulation also identifies three roles
with a stake in personal data processing:
• Data Controllers control the purposes and means of
processing personal data;
• Data Processors are responsible for processing personal
data on behalf of a controller;
• Data Subjects are people whose personal data is pro-
cessed by a controller or processor.
From these principles alone, it is apparent the role that
Security & Privacy Requirements can play in evaluating the
privacy impact of an initial system design. For example, the
role of requirements in expressing lawful, fair, and purpose
limited processing is well explored [9], and recent work by
Hosseini et al. [10] illustrates how Requirements Engineering
approaches can also be used to reason about transparency.
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Fig. 1. UML class diagram of IRIS meta-model elements necessary for a
DPIA
B. Capturing DPIA concepts with IRIS and CAIRIS
To assess the impact of privacy on some product, design,
or service, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in
the United Kingdom recommends several requirements for an
effective DPIA. These are required to:
• Ensure the need for a DPIA;
• Describe the data processing;
• Consider consultation;
• Assess necessity and proportionality;
• Identify and assess risks;
• Identify measures to mitigate risks;
• Sign off and record outcomes;
• Integrate outputs into a project plan;
• Keep under review.
The data that needs to be elicited as part of a DPIA pertains
to Security & Privacy Requirements Engineering, but it is
also relevant to Usability Engineering. For example, modelling
people and the contexts within which they work are important
when justifying the need for processing, or the impact that
privacy risks might have on the work associated with this
processing. To capture the impact of people on security and
requirements, the IRIS meta-model was devised to capture
the relationships between security, usability, and requirements
engineering concepts [6], and provides the foundations upon
which CAIRIS is based.
Although CAIRIS was designed to illustrate the form that
tool-support for specifying usable and secure software might
take, the sub-set of IRIS concepts in Figure 1 suggests CAIRIS
may be able to specify the elements necessary for a DPIA too.
For example, although the IRIS meta model was not originally
designed to capture the flow of information, an important
element when describing data processing, modest extensions
to the IRIS meta-model made it possible to model Data Flow
Diagrams (DFDs) by leveraging the idea that use cases can
capture data processes, and different types of asset can capture
entities and data stores [6].
III. APPROACH
We have devised an approach for conducting a tool-
supported DPIA of some system. This entails applying Us-
ability, Security and Requirements Engineering techniques
associated with IRIS, and – by using CAIRIS to specify the
data collected from these techniques – modelling the system
assets and goals, its data flows, and privacy risks.
Although this approach does not explicitly address all
requirements desired for recording outcomes, sign-off, and the
integration of outputs into a project plan, CAIRIS can still
help keep the DPIA under review. For example, CAIRIS can
generate documentation that can assist the process. Moreover,
as multiple stakeholders can use a running instance of CAIRIS,
and traceability is supported between model elements, it is
easy to keep the DPIA under review, and shared for discussion
with other stakeholders.
A. Data Collection
To establish the need for a DPIA and to collect the data
necessary to describe the data processing, the approach begins
by gathering any available documentation that describes the
practice, process, or system with privacy implications. This
can be supplemented with stakeholder interviews to understand
the relevant context of use, the nature of the personal data, the
processes and people interacting with it, and justification for
any data processing. The data collected forms the basis of the
subsequent steps.
B. Define Contexts of Use
The contexts of use that the product, service or practice
under evaluation needs to operate in are made explicit. These
are necessary to put the data processing to be described in
context. For example, a processing activity during business
hours may be different to the same process that takes place
out-of-hours.
C. Define Roles and Personas
Roles correspond with actors that the evaluated system
is defined for, while personas are narrative descriptions of
archetypical users. Roles are typed based on whether they
are data subjects, data controllers, or data processors. These
roles form the basis of actors in use cases. Roles may also be
fulfilled by potential attackers.
Personas that represent archetypical users [11] are also
defined at this stage. As these are grounded in the information
collected during the data collection stage, these may be based
on assumption-based data. Nonetheless, by acting as a speci-
fication of intended users, they encapsulate assumptions made
about users, their activities, attitudes, aptitudes, motivations,
and skills.
D. Asset Modelling
Before personal data processing can be defined, the data
itself needs to be defined. Asset Modelling involves identify-
ing information assets of value within the system, mapping
the relationship between system and information assets, and
determining the security (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availabil-
ity, Accountability) and privacy (Anonymity, Pseudonymity,
Unlinkability, Unobservability) properties of the assets that
need to be preserved [12]. As this information is captured
by CAIRIS, asset models – which are based on UML class
diagrams – can be automatically generated.
At this stage, we also consider consultation to distinguish
personal data from information assets. We do this by making
explicit that consent has been provided by a data subject to a
data controller for processing it. Because the data controller
depends on the data subject for consent, we model this
relationship by indicating that the data controller depender
depends on a data subject dependee for an asset depen-
dum. This dependency relationship – which corresponds with
authorisation relationships in STS-ml [13] and dependency
relationships in several social goal modelling languages, e.g.
[14] – is defined as follows:
Role ::= DataSubject | DataController | DataProcessor
depender dependum : Role 7→ Asset
dependum dependee : Asset 7→ Role
∀ x : Role; y : Role; a : Asset •
x 7→ a ∈ depender dependum ∧
a 7→ y ∈ dependum dependee ∧
x = DataController ∧ y = DataSubject
Consequently, personal data can be defined as the set of
asset dependums in dependency relationships between data
subject dependees, and data controller dependers:
Personal Data : PAsset
dom depender dependum = {DataController} ∧
ran dependum dependee = {DataSubject}
The depender would typically be a data controller who has
received consent from the data subject dependee to process
the personal data. However, the dependee may not be the
data subject, but acting as a proxy for the data subject. For
example, if the data controller has received consent from the
data subject to share the personal data with a third party, this
third party would fulfil the role of a data controller where the
data subject is the original data controller. Because the third
party has obligations for protecting this data on behalf of the
data subject, they are treated synonymously in our model.
E. Define Processes and Goals
To describe data processing, we rely on use cases and
goals to specify processing, and the basis of this processing
respectively. Use cases capture sequences of actions a system
performs when carrying out personal data processing with an
observable result. Goals represent prescriptive statements of
intent the system needs to satisfy. Our approach for modelling
system and privacy goals is not dissimilar to the approach
taken by PriS [4]. Goal models in CAIRIS are based on KAOS
goal models [15]; PriS goals are explicitly associated with
security or privacy properties. In CAIRIS, these properties are
associated with assets where these need to be preserved, or
threats where an attacker wishes to exploit them for his or
her own ends. Nonetheless, because goals in CAIRIS can be
concerned with assets, it is possible for goals to be associated
with security and privacy properties by virtue of the properties
of their associated assets.
To help assess necessity and proportionality, we rely on
the traceability between CAIRIS model elements. As Figure
1 indicates, goals in CAIRIS can be operationalised by use
cases. Defining these operational relationships provides an
indication that data processing is lawful if the use case actor
is a data processor or controller, and necessary because the
processing is linked to a goal. Figure 1 also shows that assets
can also be associated with goals and, when they are, this
helps indicate compliance with GDPR’s Purpose Limitation
principle by indicating that the purpose pertains to the personal
data asset processed within the associated use case.
F. Define Data Flows and GDPR non-compliance checks
Taking inspiration from LINDDUN [5], we use Data Flow
Diagrams to model the flow of personal data between external
systems and people (entities), the use cases that carry out
personal data processing (processes), and systems that store
persistent data (data stores). Data flows in CAIRIS are la-
belled, and carry one or more items of personal data. At this
stage, the assets that constitute entities and data stores should
already have been defined, together with the use cases that
describe data processing.
Once these data flows have been defined, it is possible to
carry out simple GDPR non-compliance checks based both on
the data flows and the information captured in previous steps.
For example, consider the GDPR principles that Personal
data must be processed lawfully, fairly, and transparently, and
Personal data can only be collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes. We defined data flows as fair and lawful
if, and only if processing is undertaken by a data processor,
data controller, or data subject, and processes have been
operationalised by necessary goals that specify or constrain
data processing, e.g.
necessary goals : Process 7→ PGoal
process actors : Process 7→ PRole
lawful dataflow : Entity 7→ Process
∀ x : Entity; y : Process •
x 7→ y ∈ lawful dataflow ∧
(DataController ∈ process actors(y)
∨ DataProcessor ∈ process actors(y)
∨ DataSubject ∈ process actors(y)) ∧
y ∈ domnecessary goals
While such checks are not sufficient to prove that an
emerging design is fully compliant with GDPR, they are a
Fig. 2. Final asset model of PLA assets
useful sanity check for identifying when some element of a
design might not be compliant. These GDPR non-compliance
checks have been implemented in CAIRIS; further details of
these checks can be found in [16].
G. Privacy Risk Analysis
Privacy risk analysis identifies measures to mitigate risks.
Using previous stages as input, we define vulnerabilities iden-
tified while describing the data processing, and considering
necessity and proportionality. We also define threats to the
personal data, the attackers behind these threats, and risks
that combined threats and vulnerabilities. These risks can be
visualised using automatically generated risk analysis models
in CAIRIS. Based on the privacy risks elicited, responses are
devised to attend these risks. The use of CAIRIS for risk
analysis is described in more detail in [6].
IV. EVALUATING A PATIENT-LED APPLICATION
There are many challenges associated with the safe treat-
ment of chemotherapy to cancer patients; one is ensuring
that patients are made as comfortable as possible during
treatment, and attend hospital only when absolutely necessary.
To reduce both the stress and the cost associated with patients
making unnecessary hospital trips, a UK-based e-prescription
company plans to create a handheld Patient-Led Application
(PLA) patients can use to report symptoms and the progress
made with medication they are receiving, and co-ordinate
appointment dates for hospital visits.
We evaluated our approach by eliciting privacy risks for
the initial design of PLA. The PLA currently existed only
as a conceptual design, but – before any further design &
development work – we worked with the company to examine
how it would interact with patient data and the existing e-
prescription infrastructure the company delivers. All aspects of
the PLA that involve personal data handling and processing
would need to be assessed during the DPIA. Consequently,
the scope of investigation would need to include associated
systems that handle data collected and processed by the PLA.
A. Data Collection
To begin the process of data collection, an initial hour
long semi-structured interview was undertaken on-site with
a company analyst. Interview questions began by establishing
the main areas of functionality for the PLA, before eliciting
information about who the intended users would be, what
devices they would use, and how information (personal or
otherwise) would flow between the PLA and other connected
systems. The latter stages of the interview were devoted
to understanding the threat model associated with the PLA.
Information from the interview transcript was then used as the
main source of data for the subsequent steps of this process.
This was complemented with ad-hoc communication with the
company analyst.
B. Define Contexts of Use
Because the PLA is currently only in the conceptual design
stages, and the contexts of use were not fully understood by
the company, only a single environment (Development) was
defined for this DPIA.
C. Define Roles and Personas
Based on the data collected, six different roles were identi-
fied. One of these was a Data Protection Officer (DPO) role;
a role acting on behalf of the company as Data Controller.
Three roles represented human interaction with the PLA or
associated systems: patients, medical consultants, and com-
pany employees. The final roles represented machine agents:
the host platform API and prescription system API. These two
roles were not initially identified from the data collected, but
were later added as an output from defining processes and
goals.
Three personas were created to put these roles in context,
and add a human dimension to the personal data processing.
Ben represented the company’s DPO, Catherine represented
a patient receiving chemotherapy that would use the PLA,
and Henry represented a medical consultant responsible for
prescribing the medication based on the information inputted
into the PLA. These were assumption personas rather than
Fig. 3. Data Flow Diagram showing the data flows associated with the Development context of use
personas grounded in data collected about these human roles.
The personas did, however, make it possible to put assump-
tions about the humans interacting directly and indirectly with
PLA in one place.
D. Asset Modelling
Ten assets were initially identified based on discussions with
the company. However, a further seven assets were identified
in later stages together with additional asset relationships. The
final asset model generated by CAIRIS can be seen in Figure 2.
Although the focus of the approach is the PLA, the asset model
shows that this is just part of the larger environment where
the PLA is used. This environment also includes the clinical
prescription system used in the hospital responsible for treating
chemotherapy patients, and the private sector infrastructure
providing hosting services to both the hospital and the PLA.
An initial dependency relationship was added to indicate
that a DPO is dependent on patients for providing the consent
necessary for the PLA to process a subset of patient records.
However, as additional assets were elicited in later stages,
dependency relationships between these roles were also added
for medication progress data, appointments, and symptoms.
E. Define Processes and Goals
Goals related to the PLA were then elicited and modelled.
From the interview transcript, 22 goals were obtained from
where it was explicitly stated what mechanics and functionality
they required PLA to have. These goals were then broken
down into high level goals elicited from the interview, and
further refined as sub-goals.
Nine data processing activities were elicited from the source
data, and inferred from the analysis carried out in previous
steps. Seven of these processes were use cases associated
with the PLA, e.g. registering and authenticating with the
PLA, inputting symptoms and tracking medical dosage and
confirming appointments with the hospital. However, two
processes were associated with external systems that process
or manage personal data collected by the PLA.
F. Define Data Flows and GDPR non-compliance checks
The DFD generated by CAIRIS shown in Figure 3 illustrates
the information flows associated with the PLA, the data
processing it needs to support, and the associated data pro-
cessing in related systems such as the hospital, and managed
infrastructure used by both the hospital and the PLA. The
DFD also shows dotted boxes that represent trust boundaries;
these are anywhere where data flows cross privilege levels
[17]. These trust boundaries delimit the processing that takes
place within the PLA, the hospital, and the managed infras-
tructure. Examining these data flows, particularly where the
trust boundaries were, was useful for identifying potential
vulnerabilities and threats.
A GDPR non-compliance check of the emerging CAIRIS
model flagged 17 warnings. The majority of these were
necessary processing warnings due to use cases processing
personal data without any indication why the data processing
was necessary. The data purpose validation warnings were
generated because no goals were currently associated with the
personal data being processed, therefore additional goals were
identified to protect the personal data processed by the PLA
and associated systems.
G. Privacy Risk Analysis
Based on the privacy risk analysis undertaken, two privacy
risks were identified. The first related to the creation of
multiple PLA accounts. The second, as illustrated by the
CAIRIS risk analysis model in Figure 4, relates to the in-
correct prescription of medication. This risk puts into context
what happens when Catherine enters inaccurate information,
which is acknowledged by Eve – another consultant handling
Catherine’s treatment – in time for the next prescription cycle.
The inaccuracy leads to the diagnosis of incorrect symptoms,
and the subsequent prescription of incorrect medication. Figure
4 shows both the vulnerability (PLA misinformation) and the
threat (Incorrect symptoms) leading to the risk, together with
the assets associated with both. This is considered a privacy
risk because the assets Symptoms andMedication Dosage were
previously identified as personal data.
Fig. 4. Risk Analysis model showing the elements contributing to the
prescription of incorrect medication
The DFD in Figure 3 also provided some help in re-
sponding to this risk. In addition to revising the design of
the PLA interfaces reporting the symptoms, the quality of
the information flowing between the PLA and the consultant
needs to be accounted for. It is also necessary to identify any
additional processing that might take place within the hospital
trust boundary, and look for any ambiguity in the handling of
personal data in the Acknowledges Patient Feedback process.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a tool-supported DPIA process
based on CAIRIS to help assess the impact that GDPR might
have on some product, service, or practice. In doing so, we
have made three contributions. First, we have shown how
existing Requirements Engineering techniques associated with
IRIS can be effective when supporting the different steps
needed when carrying out a DPIA. As our approach identified,
there is no one-to-one mapping between requirements and
techniques, and several techniques might be needed to support
a single step. Second, we have demonstrated how CAIRIS –
as an exemplar for Security Requirements Engineering tool-
support – can not only support such a process, but help reason
about potential GDPR compliance issues as a design evolves.
Those interested in further details about the PLA example
or reproducing the approach may be interested in reviewing
the final CAIRIS model created by the authors [18]. Finally,
we presented a real example where our approach assessed
the conceptual design of a medical application without an
initial specification, and only the most preliminary of known
functionality. As such, we have shown that the use of our
approach, and the Requirements Engineering techniques in
general, were effective in discovering additional functionality,
and envisaging different forms of intended and unintended
device use.
We found the ability of CAIRIS to automatically gen-
erate models particularly useful for promoting discussion,
and exploring the implications of making changes in earlier
steps of the process. As a result, we found this approach
stimulated the company’s interest in not only the tool-support,
but in the Requirements Engineering techniques used as well.
Consequently, the company is considering how this approach
can be used to evaluate the impact of GDPR on other systems.
Our approach also removed some of the ambiguity asso-
ciated with how GDPR principles are interpreted. For exam-
ple, the principle of maintaining Integrity and Confidentiality
across the organisation is open to interpretation depending on
how different stakeholders interpret appropriate measures for
protecting personal data. Our approach removes this ambiguity
because CAIRIS provides set definitions for these terms, and
– by visualising the impact of risk – stakeholders can use
the same model as a boundary object when evaluating the
appropriateness of mitigating controls.
An improvement to our approach would be support for re-
ferral stages throughout the process. Referral stages would be
performed after critical stages to ensure information produced
is being processed correctly. This improvement would ensure
that the stakeholders are content with what is being produced
and assessed. It would also address a threat to validity with
this approach - the lack of explicit input from a DPO or some
other stakeholder with legal expertise in GDPR.
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